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JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS BELOW 
This is an appeal from the denial of a Petition for a Writ 
of Habeas Corpus. The petition was filed in the Third Judicial 
District Court in and for Salt Lake County before Judge John A. 
Rokich. Jurisdiction is conferred upon this Court by Utah Code 
Annotated § 78-2a-3 (1989). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Does Utah Code Ann. § 77-27-25(3) properly preclude 
judicial review of an inmate's release date as determined by the 
Utah State Board of Pardons? 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
§ 77-27-25(3) Utah Code Annotated (1953, as amended): 
The determinations and decisions of the Board of Pardons in 
cases involving approval or denial of any action, of paroles, 
pardons, commutations or terminations of sentence, orders of 
restitution, or remission of fines, forfeitures, and restitution, 
are final and are not subject to judicial review. Nothing in 
this section prevents the obtaining or enforcement of a civil 
judgment. 
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§ 76-5-207(4) Utah Code Annotated (1983) (now replaced): 
Automobile homicide is a felony of the third degree. 
§ 76-3-203(3) Utah Code Annotated (1953, as amended): 
In the case of a felony of the third degree, for a term not 
to exceed five years but if the trier of fact finds a firearm or 
a facsimile, or the representation of a firearm was used in the 
commission or furtherance of the felony, the court may 
additionally sentence the person convicted for an indeterminate 
term not to exceed five years to run consecutively and not 
concurrently. 
§ 77-18-4 Utah Code Annotated (1953, as amended): 
Whenever a person in convicted of a crime and the judgment 
provides for a commitment to the state prison, the court shall 
not fix a definite term of imprisonment unless otherwise provided 
by law. The sentence and judgment of imprisonment shall be for 
an indeterminate term of not less that the minimum and not to 
exceed the maximum term provided by law for the particular crime. 
Except as otherwise expressly provided by law, every sentence, 
regardless of its form or terms, which purports to be for a 
shorter or different period of time, shall be construed to be a 
sentence for the term between the minimum and maximum periods of 
time provided by law and shall continue until the maximum period 
has been reached unless sooner terminated or commuted by 
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authority of the board of pardons. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On March 20, 1989, the appellant filed a Petition for Writ 
of Habeas Corpus with the Third Judicial District Court. (R. 2) 
The respondents filed an answer (R. 53), a motion to dismiss (R. 
51), and a memorandum in support of the motion to dismiss (R. 
46). A hearing was held before Judge John A. Rokich on June 5, 
1989 (R. 62). The Court made findings of fact, conclusions of 
law (R.70) and ordered the petition dismissed (R. 64). Appellant 
filed a Notice of Appeal (R. 63). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Appellant entered a guilty plea to a third degree felony 
charge of automobile homicide and was committed to the Utah State 
Prison by the Second Judicial District Court in and For Davis 
County for a term not to exceed five years. The appellant was 
given a parole hearing on February 3, 1989, but was denied parole 
by the Board of Pardons (R. 10) and was given a five year 
sentence expiration date. 
The appellant filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus 
raising a number of grounds, but primarily complaining about the 
length of sentence and how it exceeded guideline recommendations 
in his case (R. 2-33). The defendants moved to dismiss, largely 
on the grounds and that the Court statutorily cannot review Board 
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of Pardons decisions. The Court held a hearing and dismissed the 
petition (R. 62). The Court entered findings of fact, 
conclusions of law (R. 70), and ordered dismissal of the petition 
(R. 65). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The gravamen of the appellant's claim is that he feels he 
was unjustly given a five-year sentence, and that § 77-27-5(3) 
must be unconstitutional since it does not allow for review of 
that sentence. The defendants position is that a properly 
convicted felon has no constitutional right to parole, and in the 
absence of a protected liberty interest in the parole grant 
process, an inmate is not entitled to judicial review of a parole 
denial. In addition, the appellant has failed to procedurally 
attack any of the lower Court's findings or conclusion, and has 
failed to provide this Court any grounds for reversal. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. THE APPELLANT HAS NO CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO PAROLE. 
Utah's system of sentencing involves, for the most part, the 
use of indeterminate terms of commitment. The appellant in this 
case was committed to the Utah State Prison for an indeterminate 
term not to exceed five years. This is the appropriate term for 
the offense of automobile homicide. See: § 76-5-207(4) Utah 
Code Annotated (1983, now replaced) (automobile homicide is a 
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third degree felony); S 76-3-203(3) Utah Code Annotated (1953, as 
amended) (third degree felonies are punishable by a term in the 
Utah State Prison not to exceed five years). Once an offender is 
committed to the state prison, the Court no longer has authority 
over the offender's release date. That release date is up to the 
board of pardons, who can shorten (but not lengthen) the prison 
term, by commutation, pardon, parole or other mechanism. See; § 
77-18-4 Utah Code Annotated (1953, as amended). This process has 
been made clear by the Utah State Supreme Court in the case of 
State v. Schreuder, 712 P.2d 264 (Utah 1985). "Once sentence has 
been imposed by the court, our sentencing system vests almost 
complete discretion in the Board of Pardons to determine the 
period of time that will actually be served." .Id. at 277. 
The Board of Pardons made a determination in the appellant's 
case that the release date should be at the conclusion of the 
entire term. The appellant disputes the fairness of that 
determination, referring the Court to such factors as his age, 
his prior criminal history, and punishments of other offenders. 
The release determinations are not subject to review by the 
Courts. See: § 77-27-5(3) Utah Code Annotated (1953, as 
amended). Utah's Courts have consistently applied this section 
in rejecting inmates' claims that the parole board had improperly 
applied or ignored guidelines in their cases. See: White v. 
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Utah State Board of Pardons, Case no. 890126-CA (Utah Ct. App. 
Memorandum Decision, July 31, 1989); Summers v. Utah Board of 
Pardons, Case no. 890195-CA (Utah Ct. App. Memorandum Decision, 
June 22, 1989). § 77-27-5(3) constitutionally forbids the 
Courts' review of Board of Pardons' decisions because parole 
release decisions are entirely discretionary with the board; 
there is no constitutional right to be paroled, nor is there a 
protected liberty interest at stake in the parole grant process 
which would be afforded due process protection. As the United 
State Supreme Court has explained: "There is no constitutional 
or inherent right of a convicted person to be conditionally 
released before the expiration of a valid sentence." Greenholtz 
v. Inmates of the Neb. Penal and Correctional Complex, 442 U.S. 
1, 7 (1979). A due process interest in the parole grant process 
simply does not exist absent a statutory scheme creating such. 
Utah's statutes have created no such interest. In rejecting a 
similar type of claim brought before the United States District 
Court for Utah Judge Anderson has explained: 
Some state laws provide mandatory parole 
release standards that must then be carried 
out with due process guarantees. U.S. Const, 
amend. XIV. In these instances, state 
prisoners may have a claim for injunctive 
relief if they are prejudiced by false 
information in their prison records. In 
contrast, the Tenth Circuit has concluded 
that Utah Statutes simply established a 
parole system but did not give rise to a 
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constitutionally protected interest in 
obtaining parole. Dock v. Latimer, 729 F.2d 
1287, 1290-91 (10th Cir.)/ cert, denied, 469 
U.S. 885 (1984). See Utah Code Ann. tit. 77, 
ch. 27 (1980) (as amended 1985) ["Utah Parole 
Statute"]. Amendments to the Utah Parole 
Statute in 1985 did not disturb the Tenth 
Circuit's holding. 
Gerrish v. Palacios, et a h , Civil No. 87-C-0826A, (D. Utah, 
Order Dismissing Plaintiff's Amended Complaint, March 11, 1988 at 
p. 9) (Emphasis added). 
The foregoing language quoted from the Gerrish case 
emphasizes further the appellant's problem. Since there is no 
"constitutionally protected interest in obtaining parole," (Id. ) 
the appellant has no right to complain about the any absence of 
due process at his parole grant hearing or that the board abused 
their discretion. The appellant's claim that the board relied on 
a false criminal history may initially appeal to the Court, but 
in the absence of an articulable due process right the argument 
is without merit. This is because the granting of parole and the 
application of the sentence and release guidelines is entirely 
discretionary with the board. For example, even if an inmate can 
show a complete absence of a criminal history, this does not 
entitle the inmate to parole or an early release after any 
certain time frame. The lower Court therefore properly refused 
to grant the writ. The Court was not in a position to second-
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guess the board of pardons and was statutorily precluded from 
doing so. 
POINT II. THE APPELLANT FAILS TO CHALLENGE ANY SPECIFIC FINDING 
OF FACT, CONCLUSION OF LAW, AND SEEKS INAPPROPRIATE REMEDIES. 
Appellant has not attacked any of the findings of fact or 
conclusions of law. Without doing so, the appellant provides 
this Court no mechanism to reverse the lower court's ruling. 
This principle has been clarified by this Court in the case of 
Mountain States Broadcasting Co. v. Neale, 111 Utah Adv. Rep. 50 
(Ct. App. 1989). Therein the Court stated: 
In order to challenge a trial court's 
findings of fact, a party "must marshal the 
evidence in support of the findings and then 
demonstrate that despite this evidence, the 
trial court's findings are so lacking in 
support as to be 'against the clear weight of 
the evidence,' thus making them 'clearly 
erroneous.'" In re Bartell, 105 Utah Adv. 
Rep. 3,4 (1989) (emphasis added) (quoting 
State v. Walker, 743 P.2d 191, 193 (Utah 
1987). (further citations omitted). 
Appellants often overlook or disregard this 
heavy burden. When the duty to marshal is 
not properly discharged, we refuse to 
consider the merits of challenges to the 
findings and accept the findings as valid. 
Id. at 51. 
Appellant's burden is to establish that the trial court's 
findings of fact were "clearly erroneous." The appellant has 
neither made the requisite allegation of error, nor made a 
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demonstration of such before this Court. 
Since the findings of fact remain unassailed, the lower 
court's conclusions of law retain their underpinnings as well, 
and need not be reviewed by this Court. The Court below 
specifically concluded that there was no statutory authority to 
review the appellant's sentence, and that the sentence itself was 
legal and within the bounds of the Board of Pardons' authority 
and within constitutional parameters. The lower Court also 
rejected the appellant's fifth, sixth, eighth, and fourteenth 
amendment claims. The appellant advances no specifics as to why 
those conclusions (or the finding upon which they are grounded) 
are in error. Absent that, this Court is without basis to 
reverse the lower Court's order. 
Appellant also seek remedies which this court is not free 
deliver. It is axiomatic that issues which were not raised in a 
lower Court will not be first heard on appeal (See; Bangerter v. 
Poulton. 663 P.2d 100 (Utah 1983), and that the appellate court's 
spectra of remedies does not extend past review of the lower 
court's findings, conclusions, and orders. The appellant's 
initial petition included merely a prayer for a determination 
that his incarceration was unlawful and illegal. The appellant's 
brief, however makes specific requests that his guilty plea be 
reversed and his sentence vacated. This is a fundamentally 
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different request than was made in the lower Court, as the 
efficacy of the appellant's guilty plea would remain unimpaired 
regardless of the Court's determinations concerning the Board of 
Pardons' decision-making process. Pleas are not taken by the 
Court which are contingent upon the Board of Pardons' decisions 
since neither counsel nor the Court control the Board's 
decisions. 
SUMMARY 
The appeal must fail for a couple of reasons. First of all, 
the appellant has failed to specifically challenge any finding of 
fact or conclusion of law upon which the order was based. More 
important, however is the fact that the very type of relief 
requested by the appellant is not available. The Board of 
Pardons has plenary power over the release date of inmates 
committed to the state prison. Their parole granting/denial 
decisions are not subject to judicial review because that 
decision is totally discretionary with the board. There is no 
constitutional right to parole, and Utah's statutory parole 
system gives an inmate no protected liberty interest in the 
parole process subjecting the parole board to due process rigors. 
The statutory provision (§ 77-27-5) precluding judicial review of 
the parole grant/denial decision is therefore not only 
constitutional but wise. It prevents the Courts from having to 
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entertain a review of every disgruntled inmate's objection to 
parole board decisions. The dismissal of the appellant's 
petition should therefore be affirmed. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this ITfa day of November, 1989 
Kent M. Barry ' 
Assistant Attorney General 
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